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Abstract—Execution of unknown or malicious software on an embedded system may trigger harmful system 
behaviour targeted at stealing sensitive data and/or causing damage to the system. It is thus considered a potential 
and significant threat to the security of embedded systems. Generally, the resource constrained nature of Commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) embedded devices, such as embedded medical equipment, does not allow computationally 
expensive protection solutions to be deployed on these devices, rendering them vulnerable. A Self-Organising Map 
(SOM) based and Fuzzy C-means based approaches are proposed in this paper for detecting abnormal program 
behaviour to boost embedded system security. The presented technique extracts features derived from processor’s 
Program Counter (PC) and Cycles per Instruction (CPI), and then utilises the features to identify abnormal 
behaviour using the SOM. Results achieved in our experiment show that the proposed SOM based and Fuzzy C-
means based methods can identify unknown program behaviours not included in the training set with 90.9% and 
98.7% accuracy. 
 
Index Terms—Embedded system security, abnormal behaviour detection, intrusion detection, Self-Organising 
Map. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
e are in the midst of a digital revolution where small, battery-operated and resource-constrained 
embedded devices can be seen deployed in a wide range of applications. These ubiquitous embedded 
devices have drastically transformed the manner in which the information is created, destroyed, shared, 
processed and managed. An example of this is the healthcare sector where embedded medical devices are 
utilized extensively on daily basis for processing sensitive medical data and for performing critical functions for 
multiple patients. Since these embedded systems usually handle sensitive information, it is desirable to have 
some security mechanism deployed on these devices, either in the form of software or the hardware. However, 
security of embedded devices is a challenging task and considered an open research issue due to the resource-
constrained nature of these devices [1]. For example, these devices typically have strict limitations on the 
amount of memory, computational units and power consumption. Indubitably, security has been extensively 
explored in the context of general purpose computing and communications systems, such as cryptographic 
algorithms and security protocols [2]. However, such security solutions are often incompatible with many 
embedded architectures and cannot be utilized due to custom firmware (or operating systems), limited power 
budgets and highly constrained computational resources. Consequently, conventional protection software such 
as antivirus (AV) programs, which are widely used on general-purpose computers, are difficult to implement on 
these small, low-power embedded systems.  
Indeed, researchers have explored both the hardware- and software-based solutions for securing embedded 
devices. Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) [3] or hardware intrinsic security [4], is a hardware-based security 
mechanism that was proposed to secure embedded devices physically. Integrated circuits are first identified by 
utilising manufacturing process variation and then the identities are further used for cryptography. There has 
also been research work focusing on detecting software failure, tampering and malicious codes in embedded 
architectures [1, 5]. A major drawback of these techniques is the storage of sensitive information in the system 
as “valid” samples or templates. For example, a basic-block control-flow graph (CFG) is usually stored and used 
to examine the running programs. 
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Although embedded devices are deployed in a wide range of application scenarios, they generally perform a 
small number of repetitive functions or operate in a simplified state space. The execution space may include 
activities such as actuating an electrical relay, controlling a pump, processing medical data, and collecting 
sensor readings [6]. As opposed to computation intensive conventional antivirus, detection of compromised 
activities through deviation in normal program execution is a promising solution, which is light-weight and 
arises from the intrinsic behaviour of these embedded devices. There are currently alternative solutions that may 
secure vulnerable embedded architectures [7] [8], where machine learning and pattern recognition algorithms 
are employed on human-machine interaction. Another potential technology that can be utilized for embedded 
systems security is ICMetrics (Integrated Circuit metrics) [9], which relies on the unique trace generated on the 
embedded architecture by its regular user or environment. The concept of ICMetrics is analogous to biometrics 
in humans.  Fig. 1 exhibits a typical embedded system and ICMetrics system. The ICMetric system is designed 
to be employed on previously unseen devices and to faithfully reproduce encryption keys for such devices on 
further application to them by examining a pre-defined set of measurable features of such devices. However, the 
system does require detailed knowledge of the likely distribution of such features within their domain of 
possible values for typical devices. Therefore, a significant calibration phase is required for each application 
domain for which the ICMetric system is to be employed prior to its employment in the generation of encryption 
keys. This calibration phase operates on samples taken from typical example devices which may or may not 
include devices for which encryption keys will subsequently be required. Although the system is, subsequent to 
the calibration phase, designed to operate on previously unseen devices, this is governed by the restriction that 
the measured features will behave approximately as predicted by analysis of the sample devices. The ICMetrics 
is therefore a two phase system: the calibration phase is applied only once per application domain employing a 
number of known circuits as a calibration set, while the operation phase is applied each time an encryption key 
is desired for a given circuit. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. A typical embedded system and ICMetrics system. 
 
 
Importantly, the ICMetrics based system does not need to store any user data or template and does not require 
support from operating system, thus offering multiple benefits over traditional static AV approaches like 
scanning executable, instruction sequences and CFG of an application. Irrespective of the type of application 
scenario, our approach is suitable for any resource-constrained embedded device that performs repetitive tasks, 
and thus is a generic method of securing embedded systems. As an example, such devices are predominantly 
used in the medical and automation industry, which have limited cost and resource in the system. 
In our pervious paper [10], we use Cycle per Instruction (CPI) to extract corresponding Program Counter 
(PC) values, and use it as ICMetric for correct program identification allowable to execute on the embedded 
architecture. In this paper, instead of using only unsupervised Self-Organising Map (SOM) [11] for the 
identification, both SOM and a Fuzzy C-means  [12] based approaches are separately used to classify the 
ICMetric behaviour of the embedded system. Results achieved in our experiment show that the proposed SOM 
based and Fuzzy C-means based methods can identify unknown program behaviours not included in the training 
set with 90.9% and 98.7% accuracy respectively. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: An overview of the related work in this domain is given 
in Section II. Abnormal program behaviour detection algorithms are proposed in Section III, which are based on 
SOM and Fuzzy C-means algorithms. Section IV details the experimental design and results performed on an 
ARM Cortex-M3 embedded processor to demonstrate the utility of the proposed method. Finally, the 
  
conclusions are presented in Section V. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief overview of the previous work done on the topic of embedded 
systems security. As stated in Section I, information digitization to enable quick access has rendered digital 
privacy a key issue in protecting personal data [13]. While we believe our work to be the first demonstration of 
how on-chip debug information [14] can be used to identify abnormalities in embedded system program 
execution, previous research has explored the behaviour and prevalence of code modified with the intent of 
harming a system or its user. Arora et al [1] addressed secure program execution by concentrating on the 
specific problem of ensuring that the program does not diverge from its intended behaviour. In their work, 
properties of an embedded program is extracted and used as the basis for enforcing permissible program 
behaviour.  
Software piracy has massive economic effect [15], making it essential to protect software intellectual property 
rights. Software watermarks, unique identifier embedded in a protected software to dampen intellectual property 
theft is presented by Collberg and Thomborson [16]. In [17], Kolbitsch et al proposed a malware detection 
system to complement orthodox AV software by matching automatically generated behaviour models against 
the runtime behaviour of unknown programs. Similar to [1], Rahmatian et al [5] used a CFG to detect intrusion 
for secured embedded systems by detecting behavioural differences between the correct system and malware. In 
their system, each executing process is connected with a finite state machine (FSM) that identifies the sequences 
of system calls produced by the correct program. An attack is detected, if the system call sequence diverges 
from the known sequence. The system promises the ability to detect attacks in most application-specific 
embedded processors. Wang et al [15] proposed a system call dependence graph (SCDG) birthmark software 
theft detection system. Software birthmarks have been defined as unique characteristics that a program 
possesses and can be used to recognise the program. Without the need for source code, a dynamic analysis tool 
is used in [18] to create system call trace and SCDGs to detect software component theft.  
Yang et al [19] proposed an interesting method for detecting digital audio forgeries mainly in MP3. Using a 
passive approach, they are able to detect modified MP3 audio by checking frame offsets. Their work proves that 
frame offsets detected by the identification of quantization characteristics are good indication for locating 
forgeries. The experiment conducted on 128 MP3 speech and music clips shows a 94% rate of correctly 
detecting deletion and insertion using frame offset. Panagakis and Kotropoulos [20] presented the random 
spectral features (RSFs) and the labelled spectral features (LSFs) as intrinsic fingerprints suitable for device 
identification. The unsupervised RSFs reduce the dimensionality of the mean spectrogram of recorded speech, 
while the supervised LSFs derives a mapping between the feature space, where the mean spectrograms lie on the 
label space. Experimental result illustrates that RSFs and LSFs are able to recognise telephone handset with up 
to 97.58% accuracy.  
Information hiding can be utilised in authentication, copyright management as well as digital forensics [21]. 
Swaminathan et al [21] proposes to improve computer system performance with information hiding in the 
compiled program binaries. The system-wide performance is enhanced by providing additional information to 
the processor without modifying the instruction set architecture. The presented system employs look-up-tables 
for data embedding and extraction, which is then stored in the program header and loaded into run-time memory 
at the commencement of program execution. In [22], Boufounos and Rana show with the use of signal 
processing and machine learning techniques, how to securely determine whether two signals are similar to each 
other. They also demonstrate how to utilize an embedding scheme for privacy-preserving nearest neighbour 
search by presenting protocols for clustering and authenticating applications. 
As mentioned above, software birthmarks are a unique characteristic that a program possesses and can be 
used to recognise the program [15]. Similarly, ICMetrics can be defined as a unique characteristic that a 
program possesses when running on a particular embedded device and can be used to identify the program and 
hardware. Let p, q be programs. Let f (p) be a set of characteristics extracted from p when running on hardware 
f. We say f (p) is the ICMetrics of p, only if the following two conditions are satisfied: 
1) f (p)is obtained from p running on f. 
2) Program q is a copy of p => f (p) = f (q). 
The limitations with the use of system calls for program identification [1], [5] have been pointed out in [15] 
and are more prevalent in embedded systems settings, which typically to not employ operating systems. The 
mentioned limitations are: 
1) Programs with little or no system calls such as programs solely based on arithmetic operation, and 
2) Programs which do not have unique system call behaviours may fail to exhibit a birthmark. 
Using an unsupervised SOM to reduce the dimensionality of PC values, we introduce an offset rule similar to 
  
that presented in [19] to detect compromised programs. Thus using machine learning techniques [22] we are 
able to determine whether two PC values are similar to each other, with the use of the program binaries [21] and 
no prior knowledge of the source code. Our main contributions of this paper can be summarised as follows: 
1) We introduce two anomaly detection systems which can be used to combine with ICMetrics system in the 
embedded devices, predominantly adopted in the medical and automation industry, one uses a SOM based 
classifier and another one uses a Fuzzy C-means based classifier. A comparison of the two classifiers is also 
given to show the improvement. 
2) Our approach introduces a way to extract and analyse the useful low level hardware information, and uses 
them as a feature to identify an embedded system’s abnormal behaviour, which allows our system to be 
employed in a wider range of embedded systems, as it is independent of the high level software 
environments (e.g. Operating system, source programs). 
III. METHODS FOR DETECTING COMPROMISED PROGRAMS 
This section provides details on the method for detecting compromised programs in an embedded device. 
Most processors found in embedded devices execute their programs with three structural levels [1]:  
1) Function call relationships used to represent function calls within a program. 
2) A basic-block CFG used to represent internal control flow and  
3) Instruction stream within each CFG.  
This is true for a single processor program, which comprises of a number of micro operations. Micro 
operations are very dependent on the instruction set architecture of the processor of the embedded system. The 
number of clock cycles for each instruction is dependent on the hardware architecture used, the type of 
instruction and the task to be executed. Typically, most modern pipelined processor architecture instructions 
such as Load, Store and Jump, only require a clock cycle to execute, as they need access to memory during 
processing. In particular, these multi-cycle instructions indicate where the function call or conditional branching 
occurs [4]. Multiprocessor SoCs are increasingly deployed in embedded systems with little or no security 
features built in. But the order of instructional execution on single processor architecture is not comparable to 
that of multi-processor architecture. For multi-processor embedded systems, one approach is to use a dedicated 
security (monitor) processor to oversee the application at runtime. Each processor communicates with the 
monitor processor through a FIFO queue, and is continuously checked [23]. 
For a single processor embedded systems, we can approximately detect the function call or condition branch 
based on the variance of the processor’s performance. In addition, the value of PC register shows the instruction 
stream of a program, which is also a suitable source for monitoring changes at the instruction level. By 
monitoring the processor’s performance, we detect changes in the function call and CFG, and then analyse the 
PC values within each CFG. Again, an overall evaluation could indicate whether the program is compromised or 
not. In this work, we measure the average CPI as the parameter of a processor’s performance. A block diagram 
of our proposed program monitoring systems is presented in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 2. Overall block diagram of the proposed monitoring system.  
 
 
  
The average CPI calculator in Fig. 2 is first used to calculate the average Cycles per Instruction (CPI) value, 
and it continually reads clock cycle and PC data from the time counter and PC register. This information can be 
accessed through non-intrusive debug support interface of the processor. Also the phase localiser and peak point 
detector blocks are used to obtain the function call and conditional branch location information from average 
CPI profile respectively, and then the obtained information used to extract features for the SOM and Fuzzy c-
means classifiers. The final evaluation is based on the results of the output of the various classifiers. 
A. CPI Analysis 
The complexity of instructions executed within a particular period of time represents the CPI. A good 
description of the average CPI for a processor and how it can be calculated is given in [24]. Fig. 3 shows an 
average CPI profile while a program is running in an ARM cortex-M3 processor based embedded platform, 
where instruction counter and  processor’s running frequency are set to 211 and 120 MHz respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Example of average CPI diagram.  
 
In Fig. 3, the program mainly consists of five phases, and there are also many variances (i.e. peaks) within 
each phase. A method for obtaining the positional information of the phases and peaks will be presented in the 
following sections.  
1) Phase localiser block 
There are two main sub-blocks in the phase localiser block, these are the mean filter and critical point 
localiser. The mean filter is first used to smooth the original CPI diagram, the critical point localiser is then used 
to localise the positions of each phase. 
2) Mean filter 
A rectangular window of size w is used as a mask in the mean filter, and the local average value within the 
mask is then calculated. Let f(n) denote the CPI value at position n which is always the centre point of a window 
of size w. The window mean value fmean(n) is calculated by (1): 
( ) ( ) /mean
n B
f n f n w
∈
=∑                                                    (1) 
 
 
Fig. 4. Resulting CPI diagram after applying the mean filter. 
  
Fig. 4 shows the resulting diagram after applying the mean filter on the original CPI diagram (i.e. Fig. 3), 
where w is set to ‘5’. As can be seen from Fig. 4, the variances within each phase have been significantly 
suppressed, and the boundaries of each phase still stay intact.  
3) Critical point localiser 
As the values of two adjacent points at the boundary are normally significantly different, the proposed 
method is to localise the high variance points, and then select the best candidates based on pre-defined criterion. 
Let fmean denote averaged CPI, absolute differences between adjacent elements of fmean can then be calculated by: 
( ) ( 1) ( )
mean mean
d n f n f n= + −
                                                     (2) 
where1 ,n N≤ <  N is the total numbers of elements in array fmean, d(n) is nth element in an array of absolute 
differences between adjacent elements of  fmean(n).  
A threshold t1 is first used to select the high variance elements from array d , where the indices of the 
elements are greater than t1 they are stored in array d1. After that, absolute differences between adjacent 
elements of d1 are calculated to form d2. Finally, a threshold t2 is used to select the boundary candidates, where 
elements greater than t2 are selected as the candidates. Values of t1 and t2 are fixed based on experimental 
results. In this work, t1 and t2 are set to 0.03 and 9 respectively. Fig. 5 shows resulting diagram after applying 
the critical point localiser on Fig.4. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Resulting diagram after applying the critical point localiser. 
4) Peak detector block  
In order to obtain positions of peaks and valleys, we apply the peak detector on array d rather than the 
original array fmean. Pseudo-codes for detecting the peaks are summarised as follows: 
 
Peak detection procedure: 
Input: id is an array of absolute differences between adjacent elements of 
mean
f in the ith phase. 
Output: = 1 2 3{ , , ,..., }iP p p p p where 1p is a set of locations for the ith phase.  
for all samples in id do 
    if − <( 1) ( )i id n d n  and > +( ) ( 1)i id n d n  then 
     
'( )id j = ( )id n ; /* record the amplitude in array '( )id j */ 
    end  
end 
ti=mean( '( )id j );  /*t is mean of all the elements in 'id */ 
for all samples in 'id do 
    if >'( )i id j t  then 
      pi = j;  /*mark jth element as a peak*/ 
    end  
end 
 
  
Fig. 6 shows resulting diagram after applying the peak detector on array d. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Diagram following the application of the peak detector.  
 
5) Similarity analyser  
The similarity analyser has three different parts, each with a measure to ascertain the originality of the 
program in execution. The three parts are the phase, peak and classifier. The first part is used to verify if the 
number of known phases is the same as the number of phases in the executed program. Any mismatch shows 
that the number of function calls differ, signifying an insertion or deletion. The second part compares the 
number of identified peaks within each phase. It must be noted that any difference in the number of peaks does 
not necessarily mean the program is compromised, however a variation in CPI has taken place. The first two 
parts of the analyser become useful when the system has completed a cycle. The final part of the analyser uses 
the SOM/Fuzzy C-means to measure similarity between known programs and programs currently executed. 
 
SOM based classifier 
The basic principle of the SOM is to adjust the weight vectors until the neurons represent the input data, while 
using a topological neighbourhood update rule to ensure that similar prototypes occupy nearby positions on the 
topological map. PC values extracted from the program execution trace, corresponding to the peaks in the trace 
are used as inputs to the SOM during training and testing. For a given network with k neurons and N-
dimensional input vector Ki, the distance from the jth neuron with weight vector wj (j<k) is given by 
 ( )22
1
N
i
j l jl
l
D K w
=
= −∑    (3) 
where wjl is the lth component of weight vector wj. The vector components of the winning neuron wk with 
minimum distance Dk are updated as follows, where (0,1)η ∈ is the learning rate. 
 ( )ik kw K wη∆ = −    (4) 
Updates are only carried out during the training phase. Additionally, for every neuron in the network we 
maintain two extra parameters; the minimum and maximum distances of all input vectors associated with any 
particular neuron. 
After training, the next step is to associate each of the network neurons with the corresponding program or 
sub-program. In this work, we use Vector Quantization (VQ) [11] to assign labels to the trained neurons in the 
network as follows: 
• Assign labels to all the input training data. The label is an identifier for the program from which the training 
data has been extracted from. 
• Find the neuron in the network with the minimum distance to the labelled input data. 
• For each input data maintain the application label, the corresponding neuron and the distance measured. The 
distance is maintained as a tie breaker for applications that share similar address space. 
For each network neuron, we estimate the number of programs that are associated with that neuron. If only 
one program is associated with a neuron and the number of data points exceeds 5% of the total number of 
  
program data points, the neuron is exclusively assigned to that very program. For all programs with more than 
5% of data points associated with a neuron, we create a codebook with an entry for the neuron, and the 
corresponding programs, each with its distance range (i.e. minimum distance and maximum distance). 
 
Fuzzy C-means based classifer 
Fuzzy c-means (FCM) is a method of clustering which allows one piece of data to belong to two or more 
clusters [12]. This method is based on minimisation of the following function: 
2
1 1
N C
m
m ij i j
i j
J u x c
= =
= −∑∑      (5) 
where 1 m≤ ≤ ∞ , uij is the degree of membership of xi in the cluster j, xi is the ith of d-dimensional measured 
data, cj is the d-dimension centre of the cluster, and ||*|| is any norm expressing the similarity between any 
measured data and the centre. 
 
Fuzzy partitioning is carried out with aim of optimization of the objective function shown in (5), every iterative 
optimisation update membership uij and the cluster centres cj by: 
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Similar to the SOM based classifier, the Fuzzy C-means based classifier will also record associate each of the 
cluster centre with the corresponding program or sub-program. In addition, assign labels to all the input training 
data with the minimum distance to the labelled input data. For each phase of program, the minimum and 
maximum distances to the corresponding centre of peak are also recorded. The information is maintained as a 
reference for testing unknown programs. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In this  work, we use a Keil MCBSTM32F200 evaluation board equipped with an ARM 32-bit Cortex-M3 
processor-based microcontroller for our experimental testing [25]. The ARM 32-bit Cortex-M3 processor-based 
microcontroller comes with 128KB of on-chip RAM and 2MB of external SRAM, which is widely used in 
many high-performance low-cost embedded applications (e.g. industrial control systems and wireless 
networking and sensors). We also use a combination of KEIL µVision IDE, and ULINKpro Debug and Trace 
Unit [26] to download the program and trace the instructions executed in the microcontroller, where high-speed 
data and instruction trace are streamed directly to the host computer allowing off-line analysis of the program 
behaviour [26]. It is worth noting that the experimental platform is a typical low cost ARM-based embedded 
development board, but it has very limited memory space, especially when the tracing port is enabled, there is 
only 1MB external SRAM can be used by users. Thus we can only analyse a limited number of programs at a 
time, and the complexity of the tested programs are also limited. These limitations fall within the scope of our 
initial embedded architecture, expected to have minimal memory, power and computational resources. The 
concept presented here is scalable; as the available resources increase, the complexity of applications can also be 
increased. In this work, MATLAB implementation is used for proof of concept prior to hardware 
implementation. Since the proposed method could use the debug interface of the processor together with a 
dedicated hardware module providing the classifier’s functionality to extract data and identify the system 
behaviour, it is independent of the processor’s architecture or Operating System’s kernel.   
A. Benchmark Test Suite 
In the proposed work, five algorithms from the automotive package of the MiBench benchmark suite [27] are 
selected, those five algorithms are used to train and test the proposed analysers and also there is a unknown 
program is only used in the testing. Details of the used benchmarks are presented in Table I. 
As can be seen from Table I, the six benchmarks are set with different parameters and performing various 
functions. For instance, the benchmark “angle conversion” is used to perform radians and degree conversion, 
where “NUM_TEST” indicates the number of sets of input test data stimuli. Overall, they do not only have 
  
different complexities and characteristics, but also contain similar sub-functions, which make them suitable test 
candidates for the proposed experiments.  
In order to train with all five benchmarks, they are mixed together to form a new program, where each 
benchmark is treated as a separate function call. The new program is executed twice in order to generate enough 
training samples. For testing, a random function call generator is used to switch between benchmarks form the 
test samples. Various combinations of the five algorithms are used as compromised program, where AC, BC, 
CF, RN, and SR are executed twice in each combination. In addition to the above, we also use an “unknown” 
algorithm “Fibonacci Series (FS)” to replace AC, BC, CF, RN, and SR to represent another five compromised 
programs for testing. Since the FS algorithm consists of some similar sub-functions to the known algorithms, 
this experimental setup is more suitable for evaluating the proposed system. At the beginning of the test, we run 
the original program five times separately in the embedded platform, and all the program execution trace 
profiles are stored into five different files respectively. One of the files (i.e. the training file) is used for training 
the classifiers and the remainder are used for testing. 
 
 
 
TABLE I 
DETAILS OF THE USED BENCHMARKS 
Benchmarks Description Parameters 
angle 
conversion 
(AC) 
Radians and Degree 
Conversion 
Degree range: [0 360] 
Radians range: [0 2pi] 
bit count 
(BC) Bit Counter NUM_TESTS: 500 
cubic 
function 
(CF) 
Solve a cubic polynomial NUM_TESTS: 8 
random 
numbers 
(RN) 
Random Number Generator NUM_TESTS: 3000 
square roots 
(SR) Square Root Calculation NUM_TESTS: 10000 
Fibonacci 
Series (FS) Fibonacci Series Generator NUM_TESTS: 232 
 
B. SOM classifier 
The start and end locations of each peak can be used to select a series of PC addresses, and this forms an 
input vector with 1×2048 elements, the vector values are then normalised before fed into the SOM-based 
classifier. The maximum number of nodes and iterations for the SOM are set to 20 and 1000 respectively. The 
outputs of the training are network weights, a record of each phase, the corresponding neuron(s), and associated 
minimum and maximum distance for the phase. A statistical table for each phase and estimated outputs for each 
peak are generated after the training process. The same process is repeated during the testing.  
C. Fuzzy C-means classifier 
Similar to the SOM classifier, the same PC addresses of each peak are used as the input vector of the Fuzzy 
C-mean classifier, where each input vector contains 1×2048 elements. At beginning of the processing, the 
expected the number of clusters is set to 5, and the initial centres of each cluster are randomly initialised. The 
maximum number iterations and minimum amount of improvement are set to 100 and 10-5 respectively. The 
outputs of the training are matrix of final cluster centres, where each row provides the centre coordinates and 
final fuzzy membership function matrix, and values of the objective function during iterations. Records of each 
phase, the cluster, and associated minimum and maximum distance to its centre. A statistical table for each 
phase and estimated outputs for each peak are generated after the training process. The same process is repeated 
during the testing.  
  
D. Evaluation metric 
The measurements of the evaluation mainly includes correct recognition rate (true positive (Tp) and true 
negative (Tn)), rate of misclassified samples (false positive (Fp)), and rate of samples incorrectly classified as 
unknown (false negative (Fn)). Based on the measurements, accuracy, precision and recall rates for the proposed 
system can be calculated.  
Accuracy 
It is the rate of correctly labelled samples, which can be calculated by (Tp+ Tn) / total number of samples. 
Precision 
It is the rate of positively labelled samples whose labels are correct, which measures the classifier’s 
resistance to false positives and can be calculated by Tp / (Tp +Fp). 
Recall 
It is the rate of samples that should have been positively labelled that are correctly positively labelled, which 
measures the classifier’s resistance to false negatives and can be calculated by Tp  / (Tp +Fn). 
 
A classifier’s precision and recall results provide insight into what types of errors the classifier tends to make, 
rather than only reporting the number of misclassified samples. 
E. Experimental results 
In this experiment, the proposed system classifies the programs’ peaks and phases into different categories, 
where the known peaks and phases will be assigned their corresponding names and unknown ones will be 
labelled as ‘-1’. For testing, each of the test files (27 files in total) is fed into the trained classifier to generate 
individual output files, and the 27 files are divided into three categories: 1) programs with original function call 
sequence; 2) programs with various function call sequences (including only known benchmarks); 3) Programs 
with various function call sequences (include known and unknown benchmarks). 
 
1) Programs with original function call sequence 
In this category, there are total 5 programs, which include 1144 peak samples. Overall, the proposed SOM 
and Fuzzy C-means based systems have 95.6% and 100% successful identification rates for the peaks 
respectively. Results of accuracy, precision and recall rates for each program are illustrated in Fig. 7. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Results of accuracy, precision and recall rates for category 1. 
 
2) Programs with various function call sequences (including only known benchmarks) 
In this category, there are total 10 programs, which include 2070 peak samples. Overall, the proposed SOM 
and Fuzzy C-means based systems have 90.9% and 99% successful identification rates for the peaks 
respectively. Results of accuracy, precision and recall rates for each program are illustrated in Fig. 8. 
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Fig. 8. Results of accuracy, precision and recall rates for category 2. 
 
3) Programs with various function call sequences (include known and unknown benchmarks) 
In this category, there are total 12 programs, which include 2661 peak samples. Overall, the proposed SOM 
and Fuzzy C-means based systems have 90.7% and 97% successful identification rates for the peaks 
respectively. Results of accuracy, precision and recall rates for each program are illustrated in Fig. 9. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Results of accuracy, precision and recall rates for category 3. 
 
In general, as the complexity of the test categories are varied, both algorithms in the first category have the 
best accuracy, precision and recall rates. In contrast, the accuracy, precision and recall rates of both algorithms 
in the second and third categories are relatively lower than the first one. The types and the lengths of each tested 
program in the last two categories are different, which causes the resulting rates of each program to have 
relatively higher variance than the first one. The reason for most failure cases is that some of the extracted PC 
patterns in the test programs are different to the patterns in the training programs; which further causes the mis-
identification of the similarity analysers. Especially, when the patterns of the unknown program are very similar 
to the known program (such as in scenario 3 in the testing database), the recognition rate is further decreased. 
Overall, when comparing the performance of the Fuzzy C-means based algorithm with the SOM based 
algorithms, the former has better performance than the later. Overall, the Fuzzy C-means based algorithm has 
achieved 98.7% accuracy; however, the SOM based algorithm only can achieved 90.9% accuracy. This is due to 
SOM based classifier being much affected by the number of variables and clusters in the input data, whereas, 
the Fuzzy C-means based classifier is less affected by these factors. 
It is worth noting that unlike other software-based [17, 18] and hardware-based [1, 5] approaches, our work is 
independent of the processor’s architecture or operating system’s kernel and non-intrusive, thus making it 
compatible with most modern embedded systems. In [1], the hash-checking of all CFG significantly degrades 
the processor’s performance. However, our scheme maintains the original length of the processor’s critical path 
and monitors the executing program non-intrusively, in parallel, through the debug interface, without any 
performance penalty. Although the fastest intrusion detection system is proposed in [5], only the system call 
sequence is used for the comparison of correct and compromised systems. In contrast, our system does not only 
monitor the system call sequence, but also checks the instruction sequence within the system call, which 
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captures both coarse-grained and fine-grained program behaviour in a hierarchical manner. Hence, the proposed 
work is particularly suitable for providing possible security solutions to commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
products, where the products have many restrictions on modifying their internal programs or hardware 
architectures. The proposed system can be run on a non-intrusive debug facility, an infrastructure that is 
generally used during device software development at present in all production devices, that connects to the 
targeted embedded device through a debug interface [28, 29], which consequently means that the proposed 
system would not affect the performance of the monitored embedded system in terms of additional memory and 
processor usage. In one of the authors’ previous works [30], an implementation of the conventional SOM on a 
Xilinx Virtex-4 with 40 neurons showed good results, needing only 22.1% of the available 5,184 Kb Block 
RAM. This Virtex-4 design implementation clocked at 25MHz while training with approximately 10,000 
patterns per second. Consequently, the hardware implementation of the SOM produces 30 times speedup 
relative to the original SOM implemented on a state-of-the-art PC [30]. Hence, the preferred implementation is 
to follow a hardware acceleration approach that facilitated rapid identification processing suitable for real-time 
execution. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented an approach for detecting compromised programs by analysing CPI and PC 
from an embedded system. Through monitoring the processor’s CPI, we detect changes in the function call and 
CFG, and then analyse the PC values within each CFG using SOM and Fuzzy C-means based classifiers 
separately. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm can be used to detect abnormal 
behaviour in embedded devices. Results achieved in our experiment show that the proposed SOM and Fuzzy C-
means based systems can both be employed to identify unknown behaviours not in the training set, with 90.9% 
and 98.7% accuracy respectively. The proposed work provides protection at different levels for embedded 
architectures such as function call sequence, internal control flow and instruction stream within each function. 
Since the main aim of this research work is to implement a real-time security solution for complex embedded 
computer architectures, more evaluation on realistic attacks for the proposed algorithms will further be 
investigated. For evaluation parameters of real-time detection system, the proposed algorithm can also be 
implemented with a soft-core processor on FPGA as part of an on-line protection system. The online 
implementation will have the capability of extracting execution trace from customised tracing interfaces directly 
located on the processor, determine the behaviour in real-time, and subsequently halting the program to prevent 
any harmful effect on the embedded system architecture. The idea of this work can be extended to detect 
abnormal behaviour of multi/many-core processor based embedded system by applying the proposed system on 
the each core. 
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